Combinatorial game theory

Results: 236



#Item
31Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions Paul D¨ utting1,? , Monika Henzinger2,?? , and Martin Starnberger2,?? 1

Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions Paul D¨ utting1,? , Monika Henzinger2,?? , and Martin Starnberger2,?? 1

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2013-09-29 17:50:14
32Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

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Source URL: agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-21 01:26:20
33Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan  ∗

Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗

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Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27
34Take One or Two December 2, 2015 Consider the following game. The board consists of n tokens. At each turn, a player must take either 1 or 2 tokens off the board (which are discarded). The player who takes the last token

Take One or Two December 2, 2015 Consider the following game. The board consists of n tokens. At each turn, a player must take either 1 or 2 tokens off the board (which are discarded). The player who takes the last token

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Source URL: math.colorado.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-12-04 19:21:56
35Recursive Monte Carlo Search for Imperfect Information Games Timothy Furtak and Michael Buro University of Alberta, Edmonton, T6G 2E8, Canada Email: {furtak|mburo}@cs.ualberta.ca Abstract—Perfect information Monte Carl

Recursive Monte Carlo Search for Imperfect Information Games Timothy Furtak and Michael Buro University of Alberta, Edmonton, T6G 2E8, Canada Email: {furtak|mburo}@cs.ualberta.ca Abstract—Perfect information Monte Carl

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Source URL: eldar.mathstat.uoguelph.ca

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-12 12:05:04
36Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding Kshipra Bhawalkar∗ Tim Roughgarden†  September 2, 2011

Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding Kshipra Bhawalkar∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 2, 2011

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-02-18 00:03:03
37The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University  Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-01 04:11:34
38Network Vulnerability: A Designer-Disruptor Game∗ Hans Haller† FebruaryAbstract

Network Vulnerability: A Designer-Disruptor Game∗ Hans Haller† FebruaryAbstract

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Source URL: www.econ.vt.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-02-04 09:26:29
39Surreal Numbers – An Introduction Version 1.6 Claus Tøndering 18 September 2013

Surreal Numbers – An Introduction Version 1.6 Claus Tøndering 18 September 2013

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Source URL: tondering.dk

Language: English - Date: 2015-06-12 04:34:59